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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
)
V.
)
AMANDA DIANE STINSON,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)
STATE OF IDAHO,

NO. 46717-2019
ADA COUNTY NO. CR0l-18-3702

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Amanda Stinson contends that, mindful of the requirement to provide new or additional
information in support of her motion, the district court abused its discretion when it denied her
motion for leniency under I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35). Therefore, this Court should either
reduce her sentence as it deems appropriate or alternatively, remand this case for a new hearing
on her Rule 3 5 motion.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Stinson pled guilty to failing to return a rental car per
the rental agreement.

(R., pp.32-33; Tr., p.5, Ls.9-13.)
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She accepted responsibility for her

actions, and explained her failure to return the car had been due, in part, to the fact that she had
relapsed on methamphetamine. (See PSI, p.4 (Ms. Stinson discussing the instant offense); PSI,
pp.16 & 21 (noting Ms. Stinson’s prior struggles with methamphetamine and her efforts in
substance abuse treatment programs).) The PSI author also attached part of a letter discussing
“her acceptance into the House of Esther” for the district court’s review. (PSI, pp.11, 90-91
(containing the first page of a letter of acceptance and a page of literature about that treatment
program); see also PSI, p.16 (Ms. Stinson referencing that program in other comments to the
presentence investigator).)
At the sentencing hearing, Ms. Stinson’s attorney noted that the parole board had already
met and was prepared to release Ms. Stinson back onto parole some ninety days later, contingent
on what sentence the district court imposed in this case. (Tr., p.24, Ls.5-7; see Tr., p.21, Ls.9-10
(the prosecutor noting that Ms. Stinson had absconded from parole supervision at the time of this
offense).)

As such, defense counsel recommended the district court impose a concurrent

sentence of five years, with one year fixed, as (accounting for credit for time served) that would
push back her potential parole date a few months as a consequence for this offense, but
otherwise, would not impede the parole board’s decision. (Tr., p.24, Ls.14-17.) The district
court disagreed with that recommendation as to the fixed term, though it also explained the
prosecutor’s recommendation as to the total term was too excessive. (Tr., p.28, Ls.15-21;
Tr., p.22, Ls.16-18 (the prosecutor requesting a sentence of fourteen years with two years fixed).)
Rather, the district court combined the two recommendations and imposed a unified term of five
years, with two years fixed. (Tr., p.28, Ls.15-21; R., pp.87-89.)
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Ms. Stinson subsequently filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency. 1 (R., p.86.) She
sent a letter in support of that motion, asking the judge to "consider the House of Esther
program" when it ruled on her motion, and she provided a complete copy of her acceptance letter
and the program literature. (See R., pp.91-95.) The district court denied her motion, explaining:
"While the Court is encouraged by Defendant's interest in entering the facility upon release, her
acceptance is not new or additional information which would render her sentence excessive."
(R., p.111.) Ms. Stinson filed a notice of appeal timely from the order denying her Rule 35
motion. (R., pp.115-19.)

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Ms. Stinson's Rule 35 motion.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Ms. Stinson's Rule 35 Motion
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is addressed to
the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency which may be
granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe in light of new or additional
information presented to the sentencing court. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). A
district court abuses its discretion when it fails to perceive the issue as one of discretion, fails to
act within the outer boundaries of that discretion, fails to act consistently with applicable legal
standards, or fails to reach its decision by an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163
Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018).

1

The Rule 35 motion was actually file-stamped nine days before the judgment of conviction was
entered. (Compare R., pp.86, 87.)
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"The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those
applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." State v. Trent, 125 Idaho
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).

The goals the court considers when imposing a sentence are:

(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.

State v.

Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 499 (1993). The protection of society is the primary objective the

court should consider.

Id. at 500.

The Idaho Supreme Court has also indicated that

rehabilitation is the first means the district court should consider to achieve that goal.

See

State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in State v.
Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).

Mindful of the requirement to provide new or additional information that was not
available to the district court at sentencing, Ms. Stinson asserts the district court abused its
discretion by not considering the complete information about her amenability to treatment in the
Esther House program as mitigation showing a more lenient sentence was appropriate in her
case.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Stinson respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it deems
appropriate.

Alternatively, she requests that her case be remanded to the district court for

reconsideration of her motion for leniency.
DATED this 20th day of June, 2019.

/ s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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